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Abstract 
 
Dynamic and evolved environment make the 
Information Systems (IS), and consequently access rights 
to its components, always more complex to define and to 
manage. This statement is mainly explained by the 
continuous grow of the diversity of business 
requirements and by the criticality of the resources to 
protect. Even if a proliferation of sophisticated “Identity 
and Access Management” (IAM) solutions has appeared 
on the market since end of last decade, some points 
remain poorly addressed like the definition of the access 
control policy against business constraints and their 
dissemination through distributed system.  
To bring up a contribution for improving that matter, 
our paper’s first objective is to realize the development 
of an automate deployment of policies from an 
administrative platform that encompasses business 
requirements down to infrastructure’s components and 
devices. This objective is achieved by adapting the 
XACML OASIS framework [22] and by formalizing a 
protocol for information exchange through different 
components of a multi-agent system.  
The second paper’s objective aims at providing 
guaranties that defined and deployed access rights are 
continuously aligned with business requirements. This 
objective is completed by complementary developments 
that aim to perform a systematic and/or on-demand 
audit of the effective rights against the desired ones. 
This second objective is achieved by adding new 
functionality to the proposed agents architecture and by 
adapting the protocol accordingly. 
  Practically, this research has been performed in the 
framework of the SIM [1] project and has privileged 
free and open source components for the prototyping 
phase. 
  
Keywords: Identity Management, Responsibility model, 
Policy audit, multi agent architecture. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Improving access rights deployment and giving 
business manager the confidence that rights are correctly 
enforced is our research’s aim. That twofold objective is 
nowadays challenging because the configuration of 
Information System has been subject to major changes 
since the apparition of open and distributed network. 
What was previously a rather simple manageable 
administrative task is now a work that takes considerable 
proportions. This assertion is mainly due to two 
following statements. Firstly, the management of access 
right over business assets was previously the 
responsibility of the IT staff and is now hand over the 
responsibility of business owners. This shift of 
responsibility seems reasonable in that it is the business 
that has to define which stakeholders need to access 
which resources. However, because business manager 
are not friendly with so call “unintelligible” IT 
applications, it is necessary to provide them adapted and 
clear user interfaces. First results of SIM project have 
focused on the elaboration of such interfaces by using an 
open source framework named eGroupWare [5]. 
Secondly, the management of access right that was 
previously limited to a strict company environment has 
evolved toward a wild opening. Resources to be 
accessed are no more only located on a closed network 
but may be posted on servers based on the other side of 
the world. Likely, people that need to access corporate 
information are no more limited to employees of the 
company but is largely open to others stakeholders like 
for instance shareholders that need financial information, 
providers that check the state of stock or customers that 
follow on-line the state of orders.  
Based upon that observation, it appears that it is 
unavoidable to have a trusted access control framework 
without previously having defined clear responsibility 
for each stakeholder, provisioning access rights 
accordingly to all IS components and devices, and 
finally auditing that those rights are suitably applied.  
Defining such a framework remains however 
challenging because of the difficulty to integrate 
heterogeneous applications - consequently technologies - 
to heterogeneous organizations.  
As shown on Figure 1 identity management is an 
activity that could be achieved following a life cycle 
approach. First results of our research attempt to bring 
innovation to parts “Policy Engineering”, “Policy 
Deployment” and “Policy audit”.  
The section 2 of this paper proposes a responsibility 
model designed to be comprehensible by business 
manager while offering at the same time pragmatic 
information to IT staff. To keep the paper didactic, a 
case study is introduced at the early beginning of the 
section to illustrate the concepts of the model. The 
Section 3 presents the business interface for 
responsibilities and access rights management. Section 4 
presents the agents based solution for the deployment of 
rights through the network and the audit of those rights. 
Finally, section 5 introduces future work and concludes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Identity management life cycle 
 
2. Responsibility model 
 
Our previous works [1] have presented responsibility 
model (cf. Figure 2) and more precisely how it has been 
elaborated according to a literature review and by 
confrontation to others theories. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Responsibility model 
 
To introduce this model, we proprietary propose the 
following case study and explain concepts by providing 
illustrations related to it. 
 
Mister Johnson is the manager of the IT Company 
named “HighTech”. Each year, Mister Johnson 
organizes during the Christmas period a large sending 
of postcards to all its customers. This year, Mister 
Johnson has too much work for closing the annual 
report and consequently decides to delegate this task to 
one of its employees. Because the task is less business 
sensitive as some other production task, Mister Johnson 
decides to delegate it to a part-time secretary named 
Miss Fleming. Miss Fleming has just got married and 
consequently, she accepts this additional work without 
commitment. Mister Johnson asks to the IT service 
manager to give Miss Fleming the necessary access 
right to the customers address list. The IT service 
manager asks an employee from the IT service named 
Rob to realize the necessary operation for providing this 
right. On January the 30th, Mister Johnson receives 
over 100 complains of customers that didn’t receive 
Christmas card. 
Mister Johnson has duly formalized Miss Fleming’s 
Accountability by asking her to realize the sending 
activity. It was consequently clear about what she was 
accountable to do. To achieve that sending, she got the 
necessary capability that was the access to the 
customers file. However, due to the fact that her thought 
went to her new husband rather that to the work she had 
to accomplish, she didn’t really want to achieve the 
work and failed to assure her responsibility due to a 
miss of commitment. 
Rob’s responsibility can also be analyzed by that case 
study. Rob is a well paid IT staff that is very happy with 
his function. He has received clear accountability to give 
access right to Miss Fleming and he has the needed 
capabilities due to its position as network administrator. 
He has consequently been responsible to fulfil Mister 
Johnson’ request. 
 
It exists a plethora of definitions of responsibility and 
this paper has not for duty to propose a new one. We 
may however state that commonly accepted responsible 
definition encompasses the idea of having the obligation 
to ensure that something happens. Moreover, the review 
of the literature in [2] shows that it makes sense to hang 
on to it the three additional elements that are Capability, 
Accountability and Commitment. The relationship 
between Responsibility and Capacity, Accountability 
and Commitment is of the form 0..* to 1. That means 
that being responsible involves that it is possible to 
dispose of many Capacities, Accountabilities and 
Commitment. But at the opposite, on Commitments is 
only bound to one responsibility, and adequately for 
Accountability and Capability. 
Capability describes the quality of having the 
requisite qualities, skills or resources to perform a task. 
Capability is a component that is part of all models and 
methods, and is most frequently declined through 
definition of access rights, authorizations or permissions. 
Based upon the above case study, the Capability is 
illustrate through the Miss Fleming’s capability to access 
the customer’s file. This Capability exists because Rob 
was responsible to provide that access right. The case 
study illustrates also Rob’s Capability to be responsible 
for providing access right. Indeed, due to his position of 
network administrator, he has the right to manage all 
employees’ access right. 
Accountability is a concept that exists mainly in 
requirement engineering methods and that appears 
through the obligation to achieve a task or to perform an 
action. This concept describes the state of being 
answerable about the achievement of a task. The above 
case study illustrates that Miss Fleming is accountable 
toward Mister Johnson regarding the task she has been 
assigned responsible for. In the same way, Rob is 
accountable toward the IT service manager for providing 
the access right. 
Commitment is the moral engagement of a 
stakeholder to fulfil a task and the assurance that he will 
do it. Commitment is a most infrequent concept. 
Traditional policy model such as RBAC [3] do not 
address it, however i* [4] partly introduces it (e.g. when 
defining dependency as an “agreement” between two 
actors). However, to distinguish if it is a moral concept 
or an obligation remains interpretable. This component 
is illustrated through the cases study as follow: Firstly, 
we may state that because Miss Fleming has others 
duties in mind, she has not the willingness to achieve the 
task. We may state that she is not committed to do it. At 
the opposite, Rob is a well paid IT staff that is very 
happy with his function. He is fully committed to 
perform the task. 
 
3. Business interface for responsibilities and 
access rights management 
 
In order to support our approach, we have developed 
a prototype, using the open-source groupware 
eGroupWare, which allows defining business’ processes 
on which responsibilities are assigned to stakeholders. 
 
3.1 Responsibility enforcement 
 
Using this paper’s case study, the first step is to 
define the process “XMAS-MAILING-2007 - Christmas 
card mailing – Year 2007” (cf. Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: SIM prototype process cartography 
 
The process defined different outcomes, which can be 
defined as results produced by the process : 
 
Outcome #01 : Create customer loyalty 
Outcome #02 : Present new products 
Outcome #03 : Update customers list 
 
Outcomes are reached by achieving base practices 
(BP) : 
 
XMAS-MAILING-2007-BP#01 : Card creation 
XMAS-MAILING-2007-BP#02 : Card order 
XMAS-MAILING-2007-BP#03 : Mailing list edition and 
envelopes printing 
XMAS-MAILING-2007-BP#04 : Posting and finalization 
 
Outcomes are reached by using some work products 
(WP) :  
 
WorkProduct#1 : CardCreation customer account 
WorkProduct#2 : Customers list 
WorkProduct#3 : HighTech marketing stuff folder 
 
For a better understanding and granularity, we 
defined a base practice as a set of atomic actions, called 
actions, and we define responsibilities for those actions. 
For our case study, we define for example a 
responsibility on the action “Edit mailing list” which is a 
part of the base practice “XMAS-MAILING-2007-
BP#03: Mailing list edition and envelopes printing”. 
This responsibility is assigned to Miss Fleming and is 
composed of two accountabilities “Create a relevant 
customers list for card mailing based on customers list” 
and “Modify obsolete entries in customers list”, and one 
capability (to edit the customer list, she needs to “Access 
customers list on read-write mode”). Each responsibility 
is created using the form showed on Figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: SIM action's responsibilities add form 
 
When all responsibilities are defined and assigned to 
resources, the application, using these responsibilities, is 
able to publish via a web-service, a set of XACML 
policies containing all process related policies (Figure 5 
presents the policy set corresponding to defined 
responsibilities). These technical mechanisms of rights 
enforcement are detailed in section 5. 
 
3.2 Audit module 
 
Once the deployment of the access rights is done on 
the technical devices via the multi-agent system, we 
need a mean to control, at the organizational layer, that 
polices are effectively and rightly deployed and applied 
at the technical layer to:   
 Ensure a high level of effectiveness in the 
policy deployment process; 
 Ensure a high level of correlation between 
the business policies issued from the 
organizational model down to accesses 
rights enforced at the technical devices; 
 
 
 
Figure 5: XACML Policy set generated by SIM 
prototype 
 
To reach these goals, we have developed an audit 
module that enables IT administrators and business 
managers to continually check the alignment of the 
access right with business’ requirements. This 
monitoring is facilitated by the use of dashboards that 
highlight the policy deployment status through the mean 
of charts and diagrams. With these charts, administrators 
can detect problems induced by a modification of 
(technical or business) access rights and thus mitigate 
the risk of possible impacts on the security of the 
Information System. 
The audit mechanism is illustrated through our case 
study by Figure 6 that gives a detailed view of the result 
of the audit of the  “XMAS-MAILING-2007 - Christmas 
card mailing – Year 2007” process deployment. We can 
observe that the deployment of the access right defined 
for the action “Print of B&WPrinterXYZ-CD2014” is 
not correctly deployed on the specific device and we can 
see the reason why by hitting the “error details” link. 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of deployment result for the case 
study 
 
Each action has an indicator that represents the 
“access right status” for the action. We have defined 
three possible states: 
1. “Successfully deployed”, if the access right is 
successfully implemented on the technical 
device;  
2. ”An error occurred while deploying”, if a 
problem has been encountered during the 
deployment process;  
3. “New police”, if the police has never been 
deployed yet, or has changed (on the technical 
device or in the business layer) since last 
deployment. 
 
For all actions, we can visualized the XACML policy 
linked to the right defined. For each action “in error” or 
“not yet deployed”, we can deploy the access right 
policy individually. For each action “in error”, the error 
message is available. 
The second view, presented in Figure 7, gives a 
consolidated view of the state of the policies defined for 
our process. Unsophisticated formulas have been used to 
generate the graphics but they are not detailed in that 
paper because it is not valuable at this stage of the 
research.  
 
Figure 7: Consolidated view for the process 
 
These two dashboards are obtained by comparing 
information retrieved from the deployment process and 
from the business requirements definition.  
The next section explains in details the architecture of 
the policy deployment and audit process. 
 
4. Policy Deployment and Audit 
 
We need a means to transform an instantiated policy 
(composed of concrete rules) into specific commands to 
apply on concerned devices (named hereafter technical 
modules), to verify that the policy is applied with 
success and to check that no modification is directly 
done through the technical modules. We distinguish two 
phases.  
 
The first one is the deployment: 
1. We must find all the devices (firewall in our 
case study) concerned by the policy's rules. 
2. The rules must be sent to the technical modules. 
3. Each received rules must be transformed into 
script or command. 
4. Scripts or commands must be executed and 
return an execution status. 
5. An audit is done and sent back to the 
organisational layer in order to verify that 
policies have really been applied. 
 
The second phase is the audit: 
1. The access rights defined for a user or a 
resource must be checked. 
2. The request is sent to the technical modules that 
transform it into command. 
3. Technical modules execute the command and 
result is sent back to the user. 
 
For that, several components are used (cf. Figure 8). 
Each technical module is interfaced with a Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP communicates with a 
component called Policy Decision Point (PDP) whose 
goal is to retrieve PEP and distributing rules to be 
applied. It also interfaces the policy base in order to be 
aware of new policies to apply. The PEP also 
communicates with a component called Audit 
Correlation Engine (ACE) whose goal is to get the status 
of PEP in general and the status of policies deployed in 
particular. 
 
Figure 8: Technical infrastructure 
 
The communication between the components could 
be provided by a standardized protocol such as SNMP 
[11], COPS [9] or NETCONF [10] or a multi-agent 
based communication.. We presented these different 
solutions and argued in favour or multi-agent system in 
[1]. Our conclusion was that we think that the use of a 
Multi-Agent System (MAS) is an interesting solution 
because it provides autonomous entities that can be 
collaborative. A Multi-Agent System is composed of 
several agents, capable of a mutual interaction that can 
be in the form of message passing or the production of 
changes in their common environment [6]. Agents are 
pro-active, reactive and socially autonomous entities 
able to exhibit organized activity, in order to meet their 
designed objectives, by eventually interacting with 
users. Agents are collaborative by being able to commit 
themselves to the society or/and another agent [7]. So, if 
we consider that each technical module is interfaced 
with an agent, all agents will collaborate in order to 
apply a set of common policies.  
We detail in the following agents’ architecture 
representing all components (PDP, PEP and ACE) and 
the relation between these components. 
 
4.1. Policy Decision Point 
 
The PDP's architecture is shown in Figure 9. There 
are two main modules: the policy analysis and the 
Component Configuration Mapper. 
 
 
Figure 9: Policy Decision Point architecture 
 
The policy analysis module has to perform a variety 
of validation checks. First, it verifies the syntax of the 
policy specification provided by a PIE. This module will 
then verify that the newly received policies are 
consistent with current applied rules (coming from the 
policy status base). A set of policies will be consistent if 
it can be shown that no contradictory policies will ever 
be found in a SIM system. The user will be able to 
choose the system behaviour if a conflict is detected. For 
the moment, the old rules that derivate from the previous 
policy are cancelled and the newly received policy that 
contradicts the applied rules.  
The policy analysis module communicates with a 
“policy rules status” database. This database stores the 
newly received policies and their current status (in 
progress, not applicable, by-passed, enforced, 
removed…). In addition, the module should detect rules 
that cannot be enforced due to a lack of PEP. As a 
consequence a PDP should be aware of the different 
managed PEPs. 
For this reason, a Facilitator agent helps the PDP 
agent. This agent manages the network topology by 
retrieving PEP agents according to their localisation 
(devices registered with an IP address or MAC address) 
or according to actions they could apply and their type 
(firewall, fileserver, etc.). For this, the Facilitator uses 
white pages and yellow pages services. 
The Component Configuration Mapper states in 
details which kind of actions need to be taken by which 
kind of network devices/applications. This module 
receives high level policies and generates generic format 
policies for each type of PEP (router, firewall, IDS…). 
For that, it asks the Facilitator to determine what PEPs 
are impacted by the policies update by mapping a set of 
possible actions to the current network components 
capabilities.  
If some rules are not applicable, the Component 
Configuration Mapper notifies the policy analysis 
module. This one will update the policy rules status. 
Problematic rules will be passed by, and their status in 
the “policy status” database will change from “in 
progress” to “by-passed”. Then the corresponding 
policies are sent to the concerned PEP. 
 
4.2. Policy Enforcement Point 
 
 
Figure 10: Policy Enforcement Point architecture 
 
A PEP agent manages each device that is part of 
SIM’s technical layer. Agents are specific according to 
the kind of devices or the kind of services that the device 
offers. It is specific in order to know how to transform 
policies represented in an abstract format (XACML [22] 
in our case) for applicable scripts or rules. The Figure 10 
shows the PEP's architecture. A PEP is composed of 
three modules which are referred to as monitoring, 
observation and enforcement. 
The monitoring module controls the PEP actions and 
stores all relevant actions/events. It receives abstract 
policy from the PDP and chooses which action and 
parameters must be executed to apply the policy. Then, 
the enforcement module launches this local appropriate 
action mechanism by applying the selected script. The 
progress of the operations can be provided to the 
Observation module. This last module performs 
periodically, or during a script execution, measurements 
to evaluate the current state of the PEP. But this is also 
the module by which an audit is done by sending 
feedback to the Audit Correlation Engine (ACE). 
If we take back the case study presented in section 2, 
the XACML policy generated in Figure 5 aims at 
“allowing subject 26 to read resource 31”. The PEP 
interfacing with an UNIX-like fileserver registered the 
“setfacl” action1. So it will construct its command by 
using this action with parameters included into the 
policy rule. The actions granted by the policy are “read” 
and “write”. They will be transformed into ‘:rw-‘ to say 
that “read” and “write” are allowed but not “execute”. 
The command that the PEP will execute is: 
 
setfacl –m u:26 :rw  31 
 
The “-m” option indicates that the rights are modified, 
“u” indicates that “26” is a user and “:rw-“ are his new 
rights on 31. 
 
4.3. Audit Correlation Engine 
 
The Audit Correlation Engine goal and architecture is 
equivalent to the PDP in that it also exhibits its services 
through the WSIG (Web Service Integration Gateway) 
and sends policy to the PEP. The ACE receives a request 
concerning a type of device to audit and/or potentially a 
resource or a user. As the PDP, it forwards the demand 
to the concerned PEP related to the request it receives. 
For that it asks the concerned technical modules to the 
Facilitator. At the PEP point of view, the policy 
indicates that this is not a deployment but an audit and 
for instance, instead of executing a “setfacl” command, 
it executes a “getfacl” command in order to get the state 
of the fileserver concerning a particular resource. 
To summarize, the use of a multi-agent system 
framework gives PDP, PEP and ACE the ability to 
cooperate and communicate between themselves in order 
to implement policies and get back their real and current 
status. It also provides flexibility, openness and 
heterogeneity because when we decide to add a new 
PEP, we just have to provide the agent able to concretely 
apply the policies. This solution provides also 
interoperability because the services that ACE and PDP 
offer are exhibited as web service (through the Web 
Service Integration Gateway, cf. Figure 6) for giving the 
possibility to the Organisational Layer to communicate 
with the Technical Layer and also to allow other systems 
to communicate with this agent-based policy 
deployment and audit framework. Next section details 
the links between both layers. 
 
4.4. Links with Organisational model 
 
As explained previously, our approach is based on a 
twofold development: the generation of access policies 
from the Organisational Model and their deployment 
into the different devices by the multi-agents system. 
Both layers operate in a heterogeneous environment and 
may consequently be physically or logically distant. 
Therefore it is necessary to establish communication 
way disregarding these characteristics. In this context, 
the most logical and appropriate solution is the use of 
                                                 
1 LINUX ACL expands access rights to users and 
groups. “setfacl” and “getfacl” are the basic ACL 
commands. 
Web Service. Web Services can meet the needs of 
interoperability required by SIM. Moreover they are 
independent and may hence facilitate maintenance 
without modification of the calls made by clients. The 
multi-agents system is able to publish all features of its 
agents through Web Services,. By this way, the link is 
provided with the Organisational Layer to ensure its 
monitoring and auditing. 
 
 
Figure 11: WSIG architecture 
 
As shown in Figure 11, the Web Services Integration 
Gateway plays the role of web server and so makes the 
bridge between the multi-agents system and clients (the 
Organisational Layer). Its main role is to translate all the 
functionality of agents and Web Services in order to 
ensure communication with clients. The WSIG interface 
is composed of two main entities: a web server (the 
WSIG servlet) and a specialised WSIG agent. When 
agents register themselves in the yellow pages through 
the Directory Facilitator, they are also registered in the 
Service Directory of the WSIG in order to translate them 
in WSDL format. WSIG agent is able to determine in 
real-time availability of other agents and all their 
services to update WSDL files. The Web server gets and 
forwards the SOAP requests to the WSIG agent, which 
translates them in ACL messages comprehensible by 
other agents, notably the PDP. Once agents have 
completed their work, the result is returned to WSIG, 
which forwards it to the client. The WSIG model 
architecture is an add-on of the JADE platform.  
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
 
One means for having Good IT Governance is reach 
by an effective business IT alignment. As a consequence 
defining policy against business requirements become 
crucial for business and IT managers. In this paper we 
have presented an architecture developed to applied 
access rights through the definition of business 
processes, their transformation into XACML policies 
and finally their deployment and their audit with a multi-
agent system. 
 
The future works will focus on improving three 
points: 
Firstly, our proposed prototype permits to assign 
rights directly to users. This solution in practices could 
be difficult to manage if the company encompasses a 
large number of employees. Solutions exist to face that 
problem like the usage of role or team to group peoples 
by function and than affecting rights to it. Our next 
development will run at integrating that concept in the 
prototype from the organization to the technical layer. 
Secondly, the extension of the XACML policies in 
order to manage other devices than the fileserver and in 
order to use a common policy format to deploy and to 
audit them. 
Thirdly, the security of messages exchanged is not taken 
into account: the messages between agents and Web 
Service clients are exchanged in plain text format. 
Malicious users can take advantage could take advantage 
of this lack of security and may themselves fix rights to 
various devices to generate their own security policy. As 
a consequence, we will integrate a two-factor 
authentication system for Web Service and encryption of 
messages from agents to ensure the integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity of policies. 
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